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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The Utah Supreme Court poured-over this case to the Utah Court of
Appeals for disposition on August 7, 1997.

The Utah Supreme

Court had jurisdiction pursuant to U.C.'A. § 78-2-2(g).

The Utah

Court of Appeals has jurisdiction pursuant to U.C.A. § 78-2a3(2) (j) .
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1. Is the evidence sufficient to support the trial court's
findings that there was no verbal contract of sale between
the Plaintiffs and the Defendants?
2. Was the trial court correct in finding insufficient
evidence to support a finding of partial performance by
substantial improvements by the defendants?
The standard of review is to give "deference to the trial
court's findings of fact."

Woodhaven Apts. v. Washington, 942

P.2d 918, 920 (Utah 1997).

The standard is one of "clearly

erroneous".

The trial courts' findings are not to be disturbed

unless the appellant can "marshal all the evidence supporting the
findings and then demonstrate that, even if viewed in the light
most favorable to the trial court, the evidence is legally
insufficient to support the findings.

Coalville City v.

Lundgren, 930 P.2d 1206, 1209 (Utah.Ct.App.) (quoting

Doelle v.

Bradley, 784 P.2d 1176, 1178 (Utah 1989)), cert, denied,

1

939

P.2d 683 (Utah 1997)."

Bailey-Allen Co., Inc. v. Kurzet, 945

P.2d 180, 186 (Utah Ct. App. 1997).

DETERMINATIVE LAW
The following constitutional provisions, statutes, and rules are
determinative in this appeal.
S25-5-3, U.C.A. (1953)
"Every contract for the . . . sale, of any lands, or interest
in lands, shall be void unless the contract, or some note or
memorandum thereof, is in writing subscribed by the party by
whom the . . . sale is to be made, or by his lawful agent
thereunto authorized in writing."
S 25-5-8, U.C.A. (1953)
"Nothing in this chapter contained shall be construed to abridge
the powers of courts to compel the specific performance

of

agreements in case of part performance thereof."
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case

The Plaintiffs filed a complaint for unlawful detainer of real
property based on Defendants' refusal to pay an increase in rent
on November 1, 1996.

The Defendants filed a counter-claim

asserting an interest as purchasers in the real property pursuant
to an alleged verbal contract.
B.

Procedural History
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On March 11, 1997, Plaintiffs served upon the Defendants a
3-Day Notice to Pay Rent or Quit and Notice of Termination of
Month-to-Month Tenancy.

On March 24, 1997, the Plaintiffs served

the Defendants with a 3-Day Summons and Eviction Notice.

On

March 26, 1997, Defendants responded to the Eviction Notice by
filing their Answer and Counter-claim.

On March 31, 1997,

Plaintiffs filed for a Possession Bond which the court set at
$1,500.00.

On April 4, 1997, Plaintiffs replied to the Counter-

claim and mailed the Notice of Plaintiffs Possession Bond.
Bond had been filed on April 3, 1997.

The

On April 10, 1997,

Defendants demanded a hearing, which was set for April 14, 1997.
The April 14 hearing was held to adjudicate the issue of
possession.

All parties were subject to direct, cross and

redirect examination.
1997.

The hearing was continued to April 22,

At the conclusion of the testimony, the court requested

memoranda from both parties to address the following questions:
1. Whether a verbal agreement to purchase land is
enforceable under the statute of frauds;
2. What evidence of partial performance had been
submitted to the trial court;
3. If an agreement to purchase the property existed,
when were the Defendants required to exercise their
option;
4. If there was an agreement, whether the Defendants
3

breached that agreement by failing to purchase the real
property within one year of possession; and
5. If there was an agreement, what, if any, were
Plaintiffs remedies for breach of the agreement by
Defendants.
On May 20, 1997, the trial court disposed of the case as
indicated below.

On May 29, 1997, Defendants requested ex parte

a stay of the Order and Judgment and filed their Notice of
Appeal.

On June 3, 1997, the trial court published its Findings

of Fact and Conclusions of Law as well as its Final Order and
Judgment.
C. Disposition of the Case
The Plaintiffs were granted judgment for possession and
restitution of the property as of midnight on May 31, 1997. The
Defendants were ordered to vacate the property by the same day.
The trial court terminated the month-to-month lease and declared
that any verbal option to purchase the real property which may
have been given had expired.

The trial court quieted title in

the Plaintiffs and declared that the Defendants had no further
rights or interest in the property.

The court granted judgment

against the Defendants, jointly and severally, in the amount of
$217.80 for unpaid rent and $224.00 for Plaintiffs' court costs.
The issues of waste and damages were reserved for further
determination.

The Plaintiffs bond was returned and the court
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ordered that the Plaintiffs be entitled to recover any afteraccruing costs associated with the eviction and any additional
rent accruing after May 31, 1997.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The testimony of the parties as to whether the Defendants
were purchasing the property or merely renting was sharply
contradictory.

The Defendants testified that they had purchased

the real property in the fall of 1987, on a verbal agreement.
(Tr. 4/14/97, p. 59)

The Plaintiffs testified that the

Defendants were renting the property and had been given a verbal
option to purchase the property within one year of possession.
Plaintiffs testified that the Defendants failed to exercise that
option.

(Tr. 4/14/97, pp. 6-8). The Defendants attempted to

obtain financing to purchase the property within the one year
period but failed to obtain financing or otherwise obtain funds
to purchase the property. (Tr. 4/14/97, pp. 70-71).
During July of 1987, Mr. Figueroa contacted Mr. Armijo about
renting the property.

Mr. Armijo told Mr. Figueroa that he would

rather sell the property. (Tr. 4/14/97, p. 6). The Defendants
paid $3,000.00 as a cleaning deposit.

Defendants expressed a

willingness to purchase the property, but needed time to
establish credit.

A verbal agreement was reached to allow

Defendants one year to obtain the necessary financing to purchase
i

the property.

(Tr. 4/14/97, p. 8).
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Defendants testified that on September 1, 1987, Plaintiff
accompanied them to a meeting with the Airport Authority to
discuss the purchase arrangements.

Defendants testified that

because the Airport Authority was convinced they were purchasing
the property, Defendants received a check for $4,500.00. (Tr.
4/14/97, pp. 59, 76). Plaintiff testified that at this meeting,
no one spoke to him or explained the purpose of the meeting. (Tr.
4/14/97, p. 19). A few days later, Defendants tendered a check
to Plaintiffs.

The Defendants testified the check was for

$4,000.00, while the Plaintiffs testified the check was for
$3,000.00.

(Tr. 4/14/97, pp. 7, 61).

After failing to obtain financing within the agreed upon
year, Mr. Figueroa left the property and Karen Figueroa, and for
a period of some years, had his primary residence elsewhere.
(Tr. 4/14/97, pp.11,49,67,84-85).

During this time, Mrs.

Figueroa continued to occupy the property and pay rent. Mrs.
Figueroa also obtained Food Stamps and other welfare assistance.
In the course of obtaining this assistance, Mrs. Figueroa
represented to the State that she was renting the property.
4/14/97, pp. 85-6).

(Tr.

The Defendants, for some period of time

after taking possession in 1987, purchased a renter's insurance
policy.
After Mr. Figueroa returned to the property, new attempts
were made to obtain financing.

(Tr. 4/14/97, p.14).
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Just prior

to the lawsuit being filed, new attempts were made to arrange for
a purchase of the property.

(Tr. 4/14/97, pp. 37-40).

On September 30, 1996, Plaintiffs gave notice to the
Defendants that the rent would now be increased to $450.00 per
month effective November 1, 1996.

(Tr. 4/14/97, p. 36). In

October of 1996, the Defendants responded in a letter claiming an
interest in the property.

(Tr. 4/14/97, pp. 30-33).

In November

of 1996, Plaintiffs served upon the Defendants a 3-Day Notice to
Pay Rent or Quit and a Termination of Month-to-Month Tenancy.
(Tr. 4/14/97, p. 35). During this time, Mr. Figueroa again
attempted to obtain financing and purchase the property, but was
unable to do so.

(Tr. 4/14/97, pp.40-1).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

The burden is on the Defendants to clearly establish that
there was a contract for the purchase of this property.

Given

the sharp contradictions in the opposing testimony, it falls to
the trial court to weigh credibility and decide what happened and
who to believe.

The Defendants claim that they were buying the

property for the amount of the underlying mortgage, which the
Plaintiffs were paying and liable for.

The Plaintiffs both

testified that they were only renting the property and had given
Defendants a one year option to obtain financing and purchase the
property. The trial court found insufficient evidence to support
a purchase and rejected Defendants' claim.
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This Court should not

disturb the trial court's judgment on its findings of fact and
the credibility of the witnesses and should affirm the trial
court's judgment.
ARGUMENT
I. THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS
THAT THERE WAS NO VERBAL CONTRACT OF SALE BETWEEN THE
PLAINTIFFS AND THE DEFENDANTS.
A. The Trial Court's

Findings

Plaintiffs do not dispute the Defendants version of the
trial court's findings as found in Brief of the Appellant, p. 11.
The trial court found that, at most, Plaintiffs and Defendants
had a verbal month-to-month rental agreement with a one year
option to purchase the property.

While Defendants claim they

"could not find any evidence which supports the trial court's
conclusions," (Brief of Appellant, p. 11),this was exactly both
Plaintiffs' clear and emphatic testimony.
B. Evidentiary Requirements to Show existence
Purchase an Interest in Real Property.

of Oral Contract to

Plaintiffs do not dispute the Defendants reading of the
evidentiary requirements to establish an oral contract for the
purchase of real property.

Defendants specify two elements that

are required to take an oral contract for the purchase of real
property out of the statute of frauds: First, the terms of the
contract must be "clear, definite, mutually understood and
established by clear, unequivocal and definite testimony." (Id.,
8

p. 12); and Second, there must be some partial performance which
"put[s] the purchaser or donee in a situation which is a fraud
upon him unless the agreement is fully performed." 83 A.L.R.3d
1294 (1978).

After renting the property at below-market rates

and repeatedly failing to qualify for financing, it is difficult
to see what "fraud" requires remedy.

Also, it strains the

English language to refer to the testimony given at the hearing
as "unequivocal".

The Defendants did not meet their burden in

establishing the existence of a contract, and did not even
attempt to meet the burden to show any partial performance at the
hearing.

Of the four requirements of partial performance, only

one, actual and open possession, was established at the hearing.
The fourth requirement, that the acts relied upon be referable to
the contract itself, is effectively refuted by Defendants own
brief.

In discussing the terms of the alleged contract,

Defendants brief lists only three terms, the "down" payment, the
total purchase price, and the responsibility for the taxes.
Nowhere is there room for a reference to any acts that could be
called part performance.

Any acts relied upon by the Defendants

are, then, not referenced to the contract.

C. The meeting with the Salt Lake City Airport
Evidence as to any Agreement between Plaintiffs

Authority is not
and Defendants

On September 1, 1987, the Defendants, together with Mr.
Armijo met with representatives of the Airport Authority.
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Mr.

Figueroa claims he told the Airport Authority that he was
purchasing the property.

However, this has not been

substantiated in any way and only goes, at most, to Mr.
Figeuroas' state of mind.

Mr. Armijo testified that he didn't

even know why he was there (other than Mr. Figueroa was going to
get some money) and was not involved in nor heard any discussion
regarding a purchase of the property.

D. Mr. Armijo's Testimony does not support the Existence
Oral Contract for the Sale of the Real
Property.

of an

Defendants point in their brief to testimony allegedly
supporting their contention of the existence of an oral contract.
When asked what would be required to move in, Mr. Armijo stated,
"all I want is a cleaning charge."
"If

He also testified to saying

you decide to buy it, that will go down on the payment." (Tr.

4/14/97, p. 7)( Italics added).

The cleaning deposit was to have

been converted into a down payment and be an addition to the
purchase price had the Defendants been able to arrange financing
and exercise their option to purchase.

They did not, and the

cleaning deposit remained a cleaning deposit.

The Defendants

testified that the deposit was always a "down" payment.

For

Defendants to point to this contradictory testimony and claim
that the terms were "mutually understood", defies logic.
Mrs. Armijo affirmed the testimony of Mr. Armijo regarding
what the partie's agreement was and further testified that she
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had wanted to evict Karen Figueroa after Mr. Figueroa had left
her and she was behind in her rent, but that Mr. Armijo felt
sorry for her and wouldn't start eviction procedures at that
time.
E. Payment of the Cleaning Deposit was Acceptance of the Offer to
Lease, but could not be an Acceptance of the Offer to Sell
without meeting the other Terms required by
Plaintiffs.

It is not in dispute that a payment was received by the
Plaintiffs prior to the Defendants taking possession.
dispute is the meaning to be given that payment.

What is in

Plaintiffs

testified that it was a cleaning deposit, and Defendants
testified that it was a down payment.

The trial court, as judge

of credibility, decided in favor of the Plaintiffs, and without
more than the Defendants contrary testimony, this Court should
not disturb that finding.

The testimony of Mr. Armijo alluded to

by the Defendants in their brief clearly indicates that the
deposit was to be converted to a down payment after the
Defendants arranged financing.
F. The Purchase Price in Plaintiffs'

This is not in dispute.

Offer is Clear and

Definite.

The offered price was always

whatever was sufficient to buy out the Plaintiffs mortgage plus
the cleaning deposit.

The Defendants were never able to obtain

financing and exercise their option to buy out the Plaintiffs.
II. THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN FINDING INSUFFICIENT
EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT A FINDING OF PARTIAL PERFORMANCE BY
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SUBSTANTIAL IMPROVEMENTS BY THE DEFENDANTS.
The purpose of the statute of frauds is to protect and
preserve property rights and to avoid disputes over title to real
property.

To take an oral contract out of the statute of frauds,

the contract must be clear, definite and mutually understood.
There is virtually nothing in this case that can be said to be
"mutually understood" by the parties.

After proving the

existence of a contract (which has not been done in this case),
the party seeking to rely on the agreement, must then show acts
of partial performance.

There are four requirements.

There must

be acts of substantial or valuable improvements, the giving of
valuable consideration, actual and open possession, and the acts
relied upon must be referable to the contract.

Holmgren

Brothers, Inc. v. Ballard, 534 P. 2d 611, 614 (Utah 1975).
No evidence was submitted to the trial court on the issue of
improvements completed by the Defendants.

It is now too late to

introduce any evidence to support this claim.

The issue of these

improvements was not before the court, and can not be raised for
the first time on appeal.

To the contrary, Plaintiffs testimony

was that the property was "literally run down," and Plaintiffs
"were afraid that the board of health would close it down."

(Tr.

4/14/97, p. 12). Mrs. Armijo testified that the property was
"run down" and "in need of painting and stuff like that."
4/14/97, p.52).

This testimony was not contradicted by the
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(Tr.

Defendants.
The second requirement is for valuable consideration.

The

uncontradicted testimony at the hearing was that the payment was
at below-market value and the Defendants did not keep current on
paying the taxes as agreed they had agreed as part of the rental
terms.
The third requirement of actual and open possession has
never been in dispute.
The fourth requirement that the acts relied upon must be
referable to the contract, is refuted by the Defendants.

Their

testimony that they made improvements was not only insufficient,
not credible and disputed by Plaintiffs, but any such alleged
improvements are not referable to the alleged contract and could
not, in any event, be deemed as partial performance thereunder.
CONCLUSION
The Defendants did not establish the existence of an oral
contract for the sale of the property.
the minds.

There was no meeting of

The terms as understood by the Defendants are

completely inconsistent with the terms as understood by the
Plaintiffs.
was made.

No agreement was reached, and therefore no contract

This case is a textbook example of the purpose of the

statute of frauds.

The court found at most, that there was a

verbal rental agreement with a verbal one year option to purchase
that was never exercised.

These findings are not only supported
13

by substantial evidence but by the more credible evidence and by
common sense.

The trial court had sufficient opportunity and

reason to judge the credibility of the Defendants and disbelieve
their testimony. Karen Figueroas' acknowledgment that she
represented to the State of Utah that she was renting and Mr.
Figueroas' ultimate acknowledgment that he was involved with
another woman and had left the property and not resided there for
a couple of years (after initial denials by both Defendants on
that issue) alone clearly points Defendants' lack of credibility.
The record is replete with testimony by both Plaintiffs and other
evidence supporting all the court's findings of fact and because
the evidence clearly supports its findings, the trial court's
judgment should not be disturbed, but affirmed.
WHEREFORE the Plaintiffs pray for an affirmation of the
trail court's order and judgment and an order dismissing the
Defendants' appeal with prejudice.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^^^day of November, 1997

Stephen B. Watkins, #3400
Attorney for Plaintiffs/ Appellees
HALLIDAY, WATKINS & HENRIE
376 East 400 South, Ste. 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 355-2886
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